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Abstract
We present a new measure of judicial ideology based on judicial hiring
behavior. Specifically, we utilize the ideology of the law clerks hired by
federal judges to estimate the ideology of the judges themselves. These
Clerk-Based Ideology (CBI) scores complement existing measures of ju-
dicial ideology in several ways. First, CBI scores can be estimated for
judges across the federal judicial hierarchy. Second, CBI scores can cap-
ture temporal changes in ideology. Third, CBI scores avoid case selection
and strategic behavior concerns that plague existing vote-based measures.
We illustrate the promise of CBI scores through a number of applications.
JEL: M51
Keywords : Judicial Ideology, Revealed Preference, Agency, Hiring, Per-
sonnel Economics, Law Clerks
1 Introduction
The political ideology of judges plays a significant role in understanding
judicial decision making and judicial politics. Judicial ideology has been found to
be highly influential for judicial decision making (Segal and Spaeth, 2002; Sunstein
et al., 2007; Epstein et al., 2013) and is thought to outweigh many other factors—
including legal ones—in terms of its ability to predict judicial outcomes (Ruger et al.,
2004; Martin et al., 2004). In addition, judicial ideology represents a mechanism
through which to understand the strategic factors shaping the interactions between
judges and justices (e.g., Epstein and Knight, 1997), between the judiciary and the
other branches of government (e.g., Cameron et al., 2000), and even between the
political parties, the bar, and the judiciary (e.g., Bonica and Sen, 2015). Increasingly,
judicial ideology has begun to play an important role in how the public understands
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and evaluates rulings and controversies involving U.S. Supreme Court Justices and
lower-court judges (e.g., Liptak, 2015).
Uniting all of these inquiries is the need for accurate estimates of the ide-
ology for judges across the judicial hierarchy. Despite this importance, however, the
literature has been unable to provide a dynamic measure of ideology that can be
estimated across tiers of the federal judiciary. In this paper, we offer one such mea-
sure. Specifically, we leverage the agency relationship between judges and their law
clerks. The motivation in developing the Clerk-Based Ideology (CBI) scores stems
from a long-standing belief in legal circles that judges tend to hire like-minded law
clerks, not just in terms of intellect and personality but also in terms of ideology
and politics. For example, Justice Clarence Thomas once declared that hiring clerks
was like “selecting mates in a foxhole” (quoted in Liptak, 2010) and that he simply
“won’t hire clerks who have profound disagreements with me” (quoted in Cushman
and Peppers, 2015). Another prominent jurist, Judge Michael Luttig, noted that “it
should come as no surprise to learn that the more liberal judges tend both to hire
clerks who would self-describe themselves as Democrats and to hire clerks from other
judges who would likewise self-describe themselves as Democrats, and vice versa for
the more conservative judges” (quoted in Liptak, 2010). In line with these philoso-
phies, CBI scores exploit the fact that who judges hire as clerks may serve as a proxy
for the judge’s own political and ideological views.
To estimate CBI scores, we extend existing work documenting the political
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ideology of 7,111 law clerks who have worked on federal district and appellate courts
from 1995 to 2004 and 1,220 Supreme Court clerks from 1960 to 2015 (Bonica et al.,
2016; Bonica, 2014; Bonica and Sen, 2015). For each judge in our data, we estimate
the average ideological composition of the clerks hired by that judge, re-scaled such
that all judges are placed on a single, unidimensional scale that corresponds with
existing measures of ideology. The end result is a set of CBI scores for 775 judges
from across U.S. district courts, circuit courts, and the Supreme Court.
We compare the CBI scores to three other approaches for measuring judicial
ideology: (1) by comparing them to a measure of judicial ideology based on the
judge’s own political donations (Bonica and Sen, 2016), (2) by assessing their power
in predicting Supreme Court votes, and (3) by comparing them to existing measures
of judicial ideology, including the Judicial Common Space (JCS) scores (Epstein et al.,
2007) and, for the Supreme Court, Martin-Quinn scores (Martin and Quinn, 2002),
Bailey scores (Bailey, 2007), and Segal-Cover scores (Segal and Cover, 1989).
CBI scores improve on existing measures of judicial ideology in three ways.
First, CBI scores are available for the vast majority of the federal bench, including
lower-court judges. That is, although not all judges make political donations them-
selves (which prevents the construction of ideology for many judges, as in Bonica
and Sen, 2016) or hear cases on overlapping panels (as is required for item response
theory models, which use similarities in voting patterns to estimate ideology, as in
Martin and Quinn, 2002), the vast majority of federal judges hire multiple law clerks
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each year, and these clerks often make donations.1 Second, CBI scores leverage the
fact that federal judges generally hire new law clerks each year, which enables us to
estimate judicial ideology dynamically. Thus, unlike most existing measures of lower-
court judge ideology, which estimate ideology statically at the time of appointment
(Giles et al., 2001; Epstein et al., 2007; Bonica and Sen, 2016), CBI scores capture
within-judge changes in ideology over time. Third, CBI scores have the advantage
of relying entirely on revealed preferences about clerk hiring—which in turn lessens
the concern that they are driven by case selection, strategy, coalition building, or
bargaining. This contrasts with several votes-based measures of judicial ideology
(e.g., Martin and Quinn, 2002; Windett et al., 2015). To sum, CBI scores are, to
our knowledge, among the first to allow time-varying estimates of the ideology of all
judges outside the Supreme Court—a possibility that opens up a variety of questions
for future research to explore.
To illustrate the potential of the CBI scores, we provide several applications
of their use. First, we take advantage of the fact that CBI scores are available for
1Along these lines, the more years a judge is on the bench, the more reliable our
measure becomes, as each newly hired clerk offers a potentially new data point. In
contrast, most existing measures of ideology, like JCS scores, do not grow in reliability
because they turn on information that is fixed at the time of a judge’s investiture.
The flip side to this coin is that a judge’s CBI score may be quite noisy in the first
few years of a judge’s appointment. Relatedly, CBI scores for a particular judge may
be unavailable in the first few years following a judge’s appointment, as recent clerks
may not make political donations for several years after the clerkship concludes.
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lower court judges to examine the geographic distribution of ideologies among district
courts and circuit courts. Second, we exploit the dynamic nature of CBI scores to
study changes over time in the ideology of individual Supreme Court Justices. Finally,
we show how CBI scores permit comparison of judges at different levels of courts by
studying how a potential nominee to the Supreme Court would affect the Court’s
ideological balance.
This paper proceeds as follows. Part 2 situates our contribution within the
context of previous measures of judicial ideology. Part 3 provides additional motiva-
tion for why clerk ideologies are a useful proxy for judicial ideology. Part 4 describes
the construction of the scores and provides some summary statistics. Part 5 compares
CBI scores to existing measures of judicial ideology. Part 6 provides three illustrative
applications. Part 7 discusses selection concerns and provides a robustness check by
imputing clerk CFscores using a machine learning procedure. Part 8 concludes by
discussing how CBI scores may be used in future research.
2 Existing Measures of Federal Judge Ideology
The estimation of judicial ideology has become an important part of the
study of judicial politics. A number of studies have documented the important role
that ideology plays very generally in terms of predicting judicial decision making
(e.g., Ruger et al., 2004; Katz et al., 2014). However, the importance of ideology
in understanding judicial behavior extends well beyond its role in decision mak-
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ing. For example, looking at the Supreme Court, a number of papers have relied
on measures of judicial ideology in analyzing the identity and ideological location of
the Supreme Court’s median Justice (Martin et al., 2005), how the Justices bargain
amongst themselves on the content of opinions (Carrubba et al., 2012), and the how
Justices may intellectually “drift” over time (Epstein et al., 2007). These inquiries
extend to separation-of-powers games involving the Supreme Court and Congress
(Owens, 2010), how the President might approach nominations as a move-the-median
stratagem (Krehbiel, 2007), and how the Supreme Court monitors lower-court deci-
sions (Cameron et al., 2000).
Given this scholarly interest, a fairly extensive literature has developed
surrounding how to best estimate the ideology of judges across tiers of the federal
judiciary. (See Fischman and Law (2009) for an excellent overview.) For the U.S.
Supreme Court, the fact that the nine Justices sit together makes it possible to lever-
age votes on cases to generate dynamic ideological estimates. For example, Martin
and Quinn (2007) use Bayesian item-response theory (IRT) estimation to generate
measures (known as Martin-Quinn scores) of Supreme Court Justice ideology that
have become widely used in both law and political science. Other extensions have
generated Supreme Court Justice ideological estimates that vary according to issue
area (Clark and Lauderdale, 2010) or rely in part on opinion texts (Lauderdale and
Clark, 2014). Bailey (2007) also relies on Bayesian IRT estimation and, by using
Supreme Court decisions reviewing Congressional actions as bridging observations,
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provides estimates of Justice ideology that are on the same scale as measures for
Congressional representatives and Presidents. Stepping back from votes-based ap-
proaches, Segal and Cover (1989) develop scores (known as Segal-Cover scores) for
Supreme Court Justices that rely on newspaper editorials dating from before the
Justices were appointed.
Although ideological estimates for Supreme Court Justices are both well
established and widely used, existing measures raise a number of concerns. (See Fis-
chman and Law (2009) and Bailey (2016) for overviews.) For example, Martin-Quinn
scores rely on case coding, specifically coding each vote on a liberal-conservative di-
mension, which can prove problematic when it comes to complicated, multi-issue cases
or for cases that have no clear ideological dimension.2 Another potential problem is
that votes-based measures rely on merit votes, which mean that the Court has al-
ready agreed to hear the case. The fact that Justices’ ideology influences whether
they agree to hear cases introduces endogeneity concerns and may make it difficult to
compare the scores across different terms (Epstein and Knight, 1997; Bailey, 2016).
Some non-votes measures resolve these problems, but introduce problems of their
own. For example, Segal-Cover scores exploit newspaper coverage of the Justices
from their pre-nominations days (Segal and Cover, 1989), but, as noted by Epstein
and Mershon (1996), rely both on subjective student coders (and their ability to dis-
2An example of a case with no clear ideological dimension, cited by Bailey (2016),
is Gonzales v. Raich (2005), a case about the federal government’s power under the
Commerce Clause to supersede state drug laws.
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cern fairly nuanced liberal and conservative evaluations) and also newspaper coverage
itself, which may be endogenous to the ideological leanings of newspaper editors. In
addition, Segal-Cover scores, by virtue of being estimated from pre-investiture writ-
ings, do not vary over the course of a Justice’s career on the bench, which makes it
difficult to assess time trends, including the possibility of intellectual drift (Epstein
et al., 2007).
Ideological measures for judges sitting on federal lower courts suffer from ad-
ditional problems.3 For example, bridging votes on cases to estimate votes-based mea-
sures (such as Martin-Quinn scores) is difficult because lower-court judges—including
U.S. district court judges or circuit court judges—rarely sit together outside of their
home jurisdictions. In turn, this makes it challenging to generate ideological estimates
that are comparable across different courts.4
Given these problems, scholars have developed alternative methods for es-
3We limit our inquiry and our discussion of the literature to attempts at estimat-
ing federal judge ideology, including that of lower-court judges. However, we note
that progress has been made in attempts to estimate the ideologies of state court
judges. Some notable examples include Windett et al. (2015), who use a Bayesian
IRT approach in tandem with data from Bonica (2014); Brace et al. (2000), who use
the ideological scores of key nominating actors; and Bonica and Woodruff (2015),
who present scores that rely on DIME that we also use here.
4Judges from different circuits or districts occasionally “visit” other circuits or
districts, but not all judges visit and the instances of visiting may be too few to use
as effective “bridges.”
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timating the ideology of lower-court judges that do not rely on the coding of votes.
Perhaps the best known are Judicial Common Space (JCS) Scores (Giles et al., 2001;
Epstein et al., 2007; Boyd, 2010), which leverage the identity of the appointing po-
litical actors to produce estimates of the ideology of a judge. Specifically, JCS scores
rely on well-established ideological measures (NOMINATE scores from Poole and
Rosenthal (2000); Poole (1998)) of either the judge’s appointing President or, in the
event that the President and the home-state Senator(s) are of the same party, that
of the senior co-partisan Senator (or an average of both Senators, if both are of the
same party). Similarly, Yung (2010) develops a measure of circuit court judge ideology
based on how frequently the judge votes with Democrat versus Republican appointees
during a given term. More recently, Bonica and Sen (2016) use the Campaign Fi-
nance Scores (CFscores) we leverage here to generate estimates for federal district
and circuit court judges, which are based on the judge’s own political donations.
Although the JCS scores and the CFscores are useful measures of lower-
court judge ideology, they are both estimated at time of investiture and are therefore
static measures of ideology (as are Segal-Cover scores). JCS scores are constant
over time because they are calculated based on the ideology of the politicians that
appointed the judge,5 and judge’s CFscores are constant over time because federal
judges are prohibited from making political donations.6 At least in the context of the
5JCS scores can change if a judge is “promoted” during his or her career (for
example, from a district court to a circuit court).
6Code of Conduct for U.S. Judges, Canon 5.
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Supreme Court, Martin and Quinn (2002) have shown ideological movement over a
judge’s tenure, including systematic intellectual drift (Epstein et al., 2007). Lower-
court judges, although perhaps more constrained in their decision-making, may also
exhibit temporal movements in ideology. This makes the use of static measures limited
in terms of applicability.
3 Using Law Clerks to Measure Judicial Ideology
Clerk-Based Ideology (CBI) scores of judicial ideology rely on the assump-
tion that judges tend to hire clerks with ideologies similar to their own. Several factors
support this assumption. First, a judge may wish to hire clerks with similar ideologies
because such clerks are more likely to reach the same outcome when considering how
a case should be decided (Liptak, 2010; Baum, 2014). The judge’s preference here
may be instrumental (i.e., believing it would be a waste of time to hire clerks who
disagree7) or psychological in the sense that people are drawn to those who share
their beliefs (McPherson et al., 2001).8
7For example, Justice Clarence Thomas has commented that hiring a clerk with a
different ideological outlook is “like trying to train a pig. It wastes your time, and it
aggravates the pig” (Liptak, 2010).
8Of course, other judges may be drawn for instrumental or psychological reasons
towards the opposite behavior, i.e., hiring clerks with whom they are likely to disagree.
Justice Antonin Scalia is an exemplar here, but even so, three out of four of Scalia’s
clerks were not “counter-clerks.” The result of the hiring of such counter-clerks is
10
Second, a judge may prefer to hire clerks who share his or her ideology
because of the difficulty in monitoring the clerk’s work. That is, a clerk who is
ideologically predisposed to reach a particular result in a case may intentionally or
unintentionally present the judge with research that is biased towards supporting the
clerk’s favored outcome. The larger the ideological divergence between the judge and
the clerk, the more time and energy the judge must spend monitoring the clerk’s
work. To reduce monitoring efforts, the judge may be motivated to hire clerks who
are in ideological alignment (Ditslear and Baum, 2001).
Finally, some judges may wish to hire ideologically aligned clerks because
the judge knows that the clerkship will further the clerk’s career, and the judge
might prefer to support the career of an ideological ally (Baum, 2014). For example,
Judge Alex Kozinski, a prominent conservative on the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals,
has been open about his desire to hire and train conservative and libertarian lawyers
(Kozinki and Bernstein, 1998).9 Moreover, even a judge who attempts to avoid taking
ideology into account may do so subconsciously. After all, judges have been shown to
be subject to many of the same biases as other decision-makers (e.g., Guthrie et al.,
that a judge will appear as less extreme using our measures than her or she actually
is.
9To be sure, many judges have explicitly disclaimed any consideration of ideology
in their hiring process. See, e.g., Liptak (2010). To the extent that certain judges are
more ideological in their hiring than others, our measure will provide a better proxy
for the former group than the latter. In addition, judges may not be entirely candid
in their public descriptions of how they make decisions (Posner, 2010).
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2001; Wistrich et al., 2005).
Apart from the reasons a judge may wish to hire clerks with whom they
will agree politically, clerks themselves may prefer and seek out judges whose ideology
matches their own (Baum, 2014), which represents a type of two-sided matching (Roth
and Sotomayor, 1992). That is, judges are likely to consider ideology in hiring clerks
for the reasons discussed above, and, in addition, law clerk applicants themselves
may seek out judges with whom they are in ideological alignment. This could be
because clerkship applicants believe that working for an ideologically aligned judge
will provide a better opportunity to further their own ideological goals, or it could
be because they expect that the clerkship experience will be more satisfying if they
agree with the judicial opinions that they are helping to write.
Finally, even if a clerk who begins working for a judge does not share that
judge’s ideology, it is possible that the clerkship experience itself will cause the clerk’s
ideology to evolve towards that of the judge. That is, the clerk may be influenced by
the judge and end up with an ideology that is closer to that of the judge’s as compared
to when the clerkship began.10 As long as clerks tend to evolve ideologically in the
direction of the judge (as opposed to in the opposite direction), this dynamic will also
promote the ideological alignment between clerks and judges upon which the CBI
10This influence may operate through multiple channels. For example, the judge
may convince the clerk of the rightness of the judge’s position. Alternatively, the clerk
may come to embrace the judge’s position because of cognitive dissonance—after all,
the job of many clerks is to hone arguments supporting the judge’s position.
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scores rely.
Although it is likely that neither judges nor clerks would explicitly ask the
other about their ideology during the hiring process, sufficient information generally
exists to make educated guesses along this dimension. For example, judges may rely
on the applicant’s activities during law school (such as whether the applicant was
active in the conservative Federalist Society or the liberal American Constitutional
Society), the recommendations of law professors, writing samples provided by the
applicant, or prior judges for whom the applicant has clerked. Clerkship applicants
are also likely to have information about judges’ ideologies based on prior judicial
opinions and reputations among practitioners.
There is ample empirical evidence for these positions. For example, looking
at the Supreme Court, Ditslear and Baum (2001) and Baum (2014) find a strong
relationship between clerk ideology and the ideology of the judges for whom they
clerk. As one possible pathway for this connection, Baum and Ditslear (2010) find
that the identity of the judge the clerk previously worked for provides an important
signal to the Justice regarding the clerk’s possible ideological orientation. This is
consistent with Peppers (2006), who finds in his survey of former Supreme Court
clerks a rough correspondence between the partisanship of the hiring Justices and the
partisanship of his or her clerks (Peppers, 2006, pp. 34-36). Most recently, Bonica
et al. (2016) draws on the same data we describe below and documents a positive
relationship between the ideology of judges and the ideology of their clerks across all
13
tiers of the federal judiciary.
4 Construction of the Clerk-Based Ideology Scores
We now turn to developing our Clerk-Based Ideology (CBI) scores. In this
section, we first discuss the data used in constructing the scores and how the CBI
scores are calculated, and then present some basic summary statistics. We compare
CBI scores to other measures of judicial ideology in the next section.
4.1 Data Used to Construct CBI Scores
Our approach relies on the availability of political ideology data for judicial
law clerks. The data we use come from two sources: (1) data on political ideology,
which come from the Database on Ideology, Money, and Elections (DIME) (Bonica,
2014), and (2) data on the identities of federal law clerks. We review both briefly;
additional information on both data sets, including details on how we linked between
the two sources of data, can be found in Bonica et al. (2016).
Ideology Score Data from the Database on Ideology, Money, and Elections
(DIME). DIME leverages political donations made between 1979 and 2014 that
are publicly disclosed under federal law to the Federal Elections Committee to con-
struct ideology scores, called Campaign Finance Scores (CFscores), for 13.4 million
individuals who have donated. The CFscores are scaled on a unidimensional ideolog-
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ical scale from liberal to conservative.11 On an intuitive level, the operationalization
relies on the fact that individuals tend to support those candidates with whom they
are ideologically aligned. Thus, someone who is more conservative will be more likely
to make political donations to conservative candidates, while the opposite will be true
for someone who is more liberal.
Data on Federal Law Clerks. Our sample of federal law clerks comes from two
sources. The first was compiled by Katz and Stafford (2010) and provides the names
of those who clerked on district and circuit courts from 1995 to 2004. These data
include 5,057 circuit court clerks and 12,580 district court clerks. The second source
is the Supreme Court information office. It provides the names of the 1,854 U.S.
Supreme Court clerks from 1960 to 2015. As described in Bonica et al. (2016), we
matched the CFscores from DIME to the data on law clerks. We also recovered
CFscores for federal judges who served at any point between 1995 and 2004.
One potential concern is that clerks who donate (and are therefore repre-
sented in DIME) differ in important ways from clerks who do not donate (and are
11For example, Hilary Clinton and Barack Obama have CFscores that put them
toward the liberal end of the spectrum, with CFscores of -1.16 and -1.65 respectively.
By contrast, Ron Paul and John Boehner have CFscores that put them on the more
conservative end of the spectrum, with CFscores of 1.57 and 0.95 respectively. Ad-
ditional summary statistics on the ideological leanings of various political actors and
of the bar as a whole can be found in Bonica et al. (2015) and with regards to law
clerks specifically in Bonica et al. (2016).
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Table 1: Proportion of Law Clerks Matched to Donations
Political Party of
Appointing President
Court Democrat Republican All
District Court 38.6 37.2 37.8
Appeals Court 47.0 46.1 46.5
Supreme Court 63.6 66.7 65.8
Total 42.2 43.2 42.7
therefore missing in DIME). In Section 7, we discuss how the availability of ideology
scores only for those who donate might affect CBI scores, but, as a first pass we
present some data on who donates. Specifically, Table 1 presents the proportion of
clerks who donate and are therefore represented in DIME. As the table shows, with
an overall rate of 42.7%, law clerks tend to be a highly engaged, politically active
group—much more likely to donate than are Americans in general. (The population
donation rate is approximately 5%). In addition, this fraction increases with the
political importance of the court, with circuit court and Supreme Court clerks more
likely to be present in the data.
Another potential concern with using political donations to measure ideol-
ogy is that they could be the subject of strategic donations—specifically if individuals
donate to certain candidates to further their careers or financial or professional inter-
ests. This is a topic extensively discussed in Bonica (2014), Bonica and Sen (2016),
and Bonica et al. (2015), all of which find no evidence of systematic strategic behavior.
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4.2 Construction of the CBI Scores
The CBI score for a judge is constructed from the mean of the CFscores of
the clerks employed by that judge. That is, the CBI score for judge j, CBIj, is given
by
CBIj =
1
Nj
Nj∑
i=1
CFscoreij
where CFscoreij denotes the CFscore of clerk i who worked for judge j and Nj denotes
the number of clerks in our sample who worked for judge j.12
Bonica et al. (2016) showed that clerks tend to be more liberal than the pop-
ulation. However, differences between judge’s average CFscore of clerks will nonethe-
less correspond to meaningful differences in ideology. We therefore normalize the CBI
score by subtracting the mean CBI score (-0.62) and dividing through by the standard
deviation (0.57). The normalized CBI score has a mean of zero and a CBI score of
1 indicates a judge being one standard deviation more conservative than the mean
judge. We herein refer to the normalized CBI score as the CBI score. Using this
approach, we compute the CBI score for each federal judge at the district, appellate,
and Supreme Court levels.
Along with the CBI score itself, we report for each judge the standard error
associated with that score. Because the CBI score is a simple mean, the standard error
12To reduce the noisiness of the measure, we compute CBIj only for judges for
whom Nj ≥ 4. Judges with Nj ≤ 4 tend to be those who served only a few years
during our sample.
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associated with the score, σj, is simply σj =
SDj√
Nj
where SDj denotes the standard
deviation of the CFscores of the clerks hired by judge j.
The standard error associated with a judge’s CBI score reflects the degree
of confidence of the reported CBI score. The more accurately the CBI score reflects
the average ideologies of the clerks hired by that judge, the lower σj will be. To
illustrate, suppose that a judge consistently hires only clerks with a very specific
ideology; the ideologies of the clerks hired by that judge will have a low standard
deviation, implying a low value of σj. Conversely, a judge that paid no attention to
clerk ideology in hiring and for whom clerks sought to work regardless of their own
ideology would have a large value of SDj, and hence, a large value of σj. Finally, the
more clerks a judge has hired (and the more those clerks have donated), the smaller
the standard error associated with that judge’s CBI score.
4.3 Basic Features of the CBI Scores
To illustrate the CBI scores, Table 5 presents the names of the 15 federal
circuit court judges with the most liberal and the most conservative CBI scores. All
but one of the 15 judges with the most conservative CBI scores are Republican-
appointed judges. On this list are prominent conservatives, including former judges
J. Michael Luttig of the Fourth Circuit and Samuel Alito of the Third Circuit.
However, the list of the 15 judges with the most liberal CBI score is more
surprising and, indeed, includes three Republican-appointed judges. Both David
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Table 2: The Most Liberal and Conservative Circuit Court Judges based on CBI
Scores
Appointing CBI Standard
Rank Judge Name Circuit Party Score Error
1 Fletcher, William A 9 D -1.40 0.11
2 Reinhardt, Stephen R 9 D -1.36 0.07
3 Berzon, Marsha S 9 D -1.35 0.12
4 Gibbons, Julia Smith 6 R -1.29 0.21
5 Browning, James R 9 D -1.28 0.07
6 Murphy, Michael R 10 D -1.25 0.15
7 Pregerson, Harry 9 D -1.23 0.13
8 Becker, Edward R 3 R -1.22 0.11
9 Edwards, Harry T DC D -1.21 0.10
10 Murnaghan, Francis D Jr 4 D -1.20 0.14
11 Thompson, David R 9 R -1.20 0.16
12 Wardlaw, Kim Mclane 9 D -1.20 0.19
13 Graber, Susan P 9 D -1.19 0.12
14 Wood, Diane P 7 D -1.18 0.14
15 Tallman, Richard C 9 D -1.17 0.17
178 Bryson, William C FC D 1.53 0.43
179 Miner, Roger J 2 R 1.75 0.93
180 Silberman, Laurence Hirsch DC R 1.76 0.50
181 Suhrheinrich, Richard F 6 R 1.84 0.65
182 Jones, Edith H 5 R 1.88 0.39
183 Siler, Eugene E Jr 6 R 1.88 0.72
184 Rich, Giles S FC R 1.91 0.01
185 Nelson, David A 6 R 2.09 0.89
186 Williams, Karen Johnson 4 R 2.17 0.33
187 Luttig, J Michael 4 R 2.29 0.30
188 Alito, Samuel A 3 R 2.35 0.36
189 Smith, D Brooks 3 R 2.42 0.48
190 Shedd, Dennis W 4 R 2.45 0.42
191 Edmondson, J L 11 R 2.50 0.51
192 Magill, Frank 8 R 2.87 0.88
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Thompson of the Ninth Circuit and Edward Becker of the Third Circuit were Ronald
Reagan appointees and were known for being strong moderates; Becker in particular
enjoyed a reputation for ideological plurality in his chambers and routinely invited
his clerks to spar about different cases with him. The rest of the names on the
list of judges hiring liberal clerks include known liberals such as Stephen Reinhardt
(Ninth Circuit) and Marsha Berzon (Ninth Circuit). Of the 15 judges, 9 are from the
Ninth Circuit. The scores for every federal circuit and district judge are reported in
Appendix Tables A1 and A2, respectively.
As another illustration of the CBI scores, Table 3 presents the CBI scores
for the Supreme Court Justices in our sample. The relative ranking of the Justices
recovers very familiar patterns. On the most liberal end of the hiring spectrum is
Elena Kagan and on the most conservative end is Clarence Thomas, with Justices
like Potter Stewart, Hugo Black, and Sandra Day O’Connor falling in the middle.
Perhaps the lone surprise of this table is the fact that Anthony Kennedy’s CBI score
of 1.26 is more conservative than Chief Justice John Roberts’ CBI score of 0.85.
Finally, Figure 1 explores the relationship between a judge’s CBI score and
the ideological consistency of the clerks hired by that judge. One would expect that
judges who hire clerks without regard to ideology (and for whom clerks seek to work
without regard for ideology) would have a high standard deviation of clerk CFscores
associated with them. In contrast, judges who hire clerks with similar ideologies
would have low standard deviations of clerk CFscores. It seems likely that the clerks
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Table 3: CBI Scores for Supreme Court Justices
Appointing CBI Standard
Rank Justice Name Party Score Error
1 Kagan, Elena D -1.59 0.07
2 Breyer, Stephen D -1.00 0.13
3 Sotomayor, Sonia D -0.94 0.33
4 Fortas, Abe D -0.90 0.06
5 Souter, David R -0.81 0.13
6 Ginsburg, Ruth Bader D -0.79 0.17
7 Blackmun, Harry A R -0.63 0.13
8 Stevens, John Paul R -0.63 0.15
9 Marshall, Thurgood D -0.59 0.14
10 Frankfurter, Felix D -0.49 0.66
11 Brennan, William J R -0.37 0.13
12 Stewart, Potter R -0.19 0.19
13 Harlan, John M R -0.18 0.28
14 O’Connor, Sandra Day R -0.16 0.18
15 Douglas, William O D -0.05 0.29
16 White, Byron R D 0.00 0.17
17 Powell, Lewis F R 0.05 0.22
18 Reed, Stanley D 0.13 0.48
19 Warren, Earl R 0.38 0.32
20 Black, Hugo L D 0.41 0.34
21 Clark, Tom C D 0.42 0.36
22 Goldberg, Arthur J D 0.77 0.85
23 Roberts, John R 0.85 0.49
24 Burger, Warren E R 0.85 0.23
25 Kennedy, Anthony R 1.26 0.22
26 Rehnquist, William R 1.28 0.20
27 Scalia, Antonin R 1.67 0.21
28 Alito, Samuel R 2.36 0.32
29 Thomas, Clarence R 2.43 0.15
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hired by the judges in the latter category provide a stronger signal as to the judge’s
own ideology than the clerks hired by judges in the former category. This is reflected
in the standard errors associated with the CBI scores, which, as described above,
depend in part on the standard deviation in the CFscores of the clerks hired by a
judge.
Figure 1 suggests that judges with more extreme CBI scores—either liberal
or conservative—hire clerks that exhibit less ideological diversity than do judges with
more moderate CBI scores. There are two plausible explanations for this pattern,
both of which may be partially correct. First, it could be that more ideologically
extreme judges tend to care more about the ideology of the clerks they hire than
do judges that are ideological moderates. Second, this pattern could arise if not all
ideologically extreme judges take ideology into account when hiring (or attract clerks
on the basis of ideology). In that case, these judges, though actually ideologically
extreme themselves, hire clerks from across the ideological spectrum. Such judges
would be characterized by moderate CBI scores (reflecting the mean of the clerk
ideological spectrum) and relatively large standard deviations in clerk ideology.
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Figure 1: Consistency of Judge Hiring by CBI Score
5 Comparison to Other Judicial Ideology Mea-
sures
In this section we compare the CBI scores to other measures of judicial
ideology. In particular, we compare the CBI score to measures based the judge’s
own political donations, measures of the judge’s voting behavior on cases, Judicial
Common Space (JCS) scores, Martin-Quinn (MQ) scores, Bailey scores, and Segal-
Cover (SC) scores.
We first compare the CBI score to the judge’s CFscore, which measures the
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judge’s ideology based directly on the judge’s own political donations. When a judge’s
CFscore is available, we would generally expect it to serve as a reasonably good proxy
for the judge’s ideology (Bonica and Sen, 2015). However, as discussed in Section 2,
CFscores are not observed for judges who have not made political donations and in
any case do not reflect changes in the judge’s ideology after the judge is confirmed
(and therefore prohibited from making new donations). Column 1 of Table 4 presents
the results from a regression of judge CFscores on CBI scores. The coefficient on CBI
score is positive and statistically significant, consistent with clerk hiring (and thus
the CBI score) providing a signal of the judge’s ideology.
Table 4: CBI Scores Versus Existing Measures of Ideology
Judge Cons. JCS MQ Bailey SC
CFscore Vote Score Score Score Score
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CBI Score 0.674∗∗∗ 1.032∗∗∗ 0.631∗∗∗ 1.074∗∗∗ 0.997∗∗∗ 0.961∗∗∗
(0.089) (0.273) (0.060) (0.267) (0.278) (0.283)
Obs 314 29 756 29 29 29
R-squared 0.156 0.345 0.129 0.374 0.323 0.300
Note: Each outcome is normalized to have mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1.
Next, we consider the relationship between CBI scores and measures of
ideology based on judicial voting behavior. For this analysis, we rely on hand-coded
data on whether decided cases are liberal or conservative, from the Supreme Court
database. Using this approach, the higher the fraction of conservative votes a Justice
24
casts over his or her tenure, the more conservative that Justice’s ideology. Column
2 of Table 4 presents the results from a regression of voting behavior, as measured
by the proportion of all votes which are conservative, on CBI scores. Again, the
coefficient is positive and statistically significant.13
The third measure of judicial ideology we compare to CBI scores is the
JCS score. As described in Section 2, JCS scores are based on the ideology of the
president who appointed the judge and the senators from the judge’s home state.
Whereas JCS scores infer the judge’s ideology from the political actors involved in
choosing the judge, CBI scores infer the judge’s ideology from those individuals the
judge chooses himself or herself. The relationship between CBI and JCS scores is
captured in Column 3 of Table 4. Here too, the two scores appear to be strongly
positively correlated.
Lastly, we compare the CBI scores to the MQ scores, Bailey scores, and
Segal-Cover scores, each of which are commonly used to measure judicial ideology
at the Supreme Court. As described in Section 2, MQ scores and Bailey scores are
closely related to measuring of ideology based on judicial voting. Columns 4, 5, and
6 of Table 4 present the regression results of these measures. As above, the estimated
13A caveat to this analysis is that the clerks hired by a judge may exert an indepen-
dent effect on the judge’s voting behavior. This “reverse causation” is only possible
with voting behavior and votes-based measures. This is because both the judge’s
CFscore and the JCS score are determined before the judge is appointed (and thus
before clerks could have an influence).
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relationships are positive and statistically significant.
The results of this section provide support to the hypothesis that clerk ide-
ologies provide a window into the ideology of the hiring judge. Some of the measures
discussed in this section, such as judge CFscores and measures derived from judicial
votes, are likely to be quite reliable measures of ideology in their own right. The
strong correlation with CBI scores validates our measure in cases where these other
measures are available. More importantly, it bolsters the expected reliability of using
CBI scores to measure ideology in the many cases where these other measures are
unavailable.
6 Applications
This section presents three applications to illustrate the usefulness of CBI
scores. First, we take advantage of the fact that CBI scores are available for lower
court judges to examine the geographic distribution of ideologies among district courts
and circuit courts. Second, we exploit the dynamic nature of CBI scores to study
changes over time in the ideology of individual Supreme Court Justices. Finally, we
show how CBI scores permit comparison of judges at different levels of courts by
studying how a potential nominee to the Supreme Court would affect the Court’s
ideological balance.
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6.1 Judicial Ideology by Location
An appealing feature of CBI scores is that one may use them to measure of
the ideology of a given district or circuit court. CBI scores can therefore be used to
study differences in judicial ideology by geography. To illustrate this feature, Figure
2 maps of the political ideology of district courts and circuit courts. For the top
panel, CBI scores are calculated for each district court judge, and averaged over the
district courts located in each state. The map suggests that the ideology of district
court judges tracks the distribution of political ideology in the country more generally.
The bottom panel of Figure 2 provides the circuit-level average CBI scores for the 12
circuit courts and the Federal Circuit. The results suggest that the First Circuit is
the most liberal circuit and the Federal Circuit the most conservative.
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Figure 2: Map of Average CBI Scores in District and Circuit Courts
Panel A: District Courts (by state)
Panel B: Circuit Courts
CBI Score
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Because JCS scores may also be used to investigate differences in judicial
ideology by circuit or state, it is interesting to compare our results to what would
be obtained from relying on JCS scores. Table 5 ranks each circuit by the average
ideology of its judges according to both CBI scores and JCS scores. Although the
rankings are broadly similar, several circuits are ranked quite differently. In particular,
the First Circuit is the most liberal circuit according to CBI scores but only the ninth
most liberal according to JCS scores. Conversely, the Eighth Circuit is the fourth
most liberal circuit according to JCS, but the ninth most liberal according to CBI.
These discrepancies can be explained based on the different methodologies that go
into the calculation of the CBI scores and JCS scores. For instance, a number of
judges who appear liberal under the CBI score (e.g., Boudin, Stahl) from the First
Circuit appear conservative under the JCS score because they were appointed by
Republican presidents to serve in liberal states represented by Democratic senators.
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Table 5: Circuits Ranking with CBI Score and JCS Score
Ordinal Ranking Mean Score
Circuit CBI JCS CBI JCS
1 1 9 -0.69 0.11
2 2 1 -0.49 -0.18
3 5 3 -0.04 -0.02
4 10 8 0.38 0.11
5 11 12 0.38 0.22
6 8 7 0.24 0.10
7 7 5 0.08 0.06
8 9 4 0.30 0.04
9 3 2 -0.39 -0.04
10 6 10 0.06 0.13
11 12 11 0.41 0.18
DC 4 6 -0.24 0.09
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6.2 Ideological Drift
An advantage of CBI scores is that they provide a way to measure changes
in a judge’s ideology over time. Although year-to-year changes in clerk ideology are
more likely to reflect idiosyncratic noise rather than changes in judge ideology, a
consistent shift in clerk ideology between the early and late stages of a judge’s career
may indicate ideological evolution over time.
To illustrate the dynamic nature of the approach, we investigate changes
in the ideology of U.S. Supreme Court Justices over time. We focus this analysis on
Supreme Court Justices because we have a longer window of data availability for this
group; future work could extend this approach to district court or circuit judges. The
specification we consider is:
CBIjt = αj + βj t+ εjt
where the unit of observation is Justice j in term t. The coefficient of interest is βj,
which measures whether the ideology of the Justice has systematically changed over
the course of his or her tenure on the Supreme Court.
31
Figure 3: Ideological Drift of Supreme Court Justices Over Time
The results of the analysis are presented in Figure 3. The figure plots the
coefficient on the time trend for each Justice on the x-axis with statical significant
stars following each Justice’s name (∗ p<0.1, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01), along with
horizontal lines for the confidence interval of the estimated coefficients (p<0.1). A
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coefficient of 0 implies no drift, and the further a Justice is from 0 the more the Justice
has drifted. A positive (negative) coefficient implies that the Justice became more
conservative (liberal) over time. The coefficients are positioned vertically according
to the median year in which we observe the Justice.
For most Justices, no statistically significant shift in ideology is detectable
over the course of our sample. However, there are several important exceptions. In
particular, the analysis supports the common narrative that Justice O’Connor and
Justice Blackmun became more liberal over the course of their careers. The coefficient
for each of these Justices is approximately -0.04, which, over the course of a 20-year
tenure, would be associated with a shift in ideology comparable to the difference
between Earl Warren and John Roberts. The analysis also suggests that Justice
Burger grew more conservative over the course of his years on the Court.
6.3 Assessing Nominations from Lower Courts
One of the advantages of CBI scores is that we can estimate judge ideology
for all levels of the federal judiciary. Here we show how the measure can be used to
investigate how a potential nominee to a higher court will affect the higher court’s
ideological balance. In particular, we can compare the CBI score of the nominee to
the CBI scores of the existing members of the court to which the nominee has been
nominated.
To illustrate, consider the nomination of Merrick Garland to the Supreme
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Court on March 16, 2016, following the death of Antonin Scalia. Prior to his nom-
ination, Garland served on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and his CBI score is
constructed based on the clerks he hired during our sample period while on that court.
Figure 4 compares the CBI score of Judge Merrick Garland to the CBI scores of the
current Supreme Court Justices as well as the CBI score for Scalia. The analysis
suggests that Garland would be the new median vote on the Court, with a CBI score
between Sonia Sotomayor and John Roberts.14
Figure 4: Assessing the Nomination of Garland to the Supreme Court
A potential concern with the foregoing analysis is that a judge’s ideology
might change upon being “elevated” to a higher court.15 Because CBI scores are
14The difference in CBI scores between Garland and Roberts is statistically sig-
nificant at p<0.0143 level, but the difference in CBI scores between Garland and
Sotomayor is not statistically significant.
15A related concern is that the judge’s ideology does not change but the mapping
between ideology and CBI score changes, for example, because the judge is now able
to select clerks that more closely reflect his or her ideological ideal point.
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dynamic and available across multiple levels of courts, they can be used to investigate
this concern empirically. During the period for which we have data, two appellate
court judges were elevated to the Supreme Court and 8 district court judges were
elevated to courts of appeals. Figure 5 plots the CBI scores for these judges on
each federal court in which they served during our sample period. With only 10
data points, no definitive conclusions are possible, but the results do not suggest a
systematic change in ideology in either direction.
Figure 5: Ideology of Judges who Served on Multiple Levels of the Federal Judiciary
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7 Selection
A potential concern with the use of CBI scores is that not every clerk has
made a political donation, meaning that not all clerks will show up in DIME. In turn,
this could lead not only to non-random missingness in the CBI scores, but potentially
biased measures if clerks who donate systematically differ from clerks who do not.
This might specifically be a concern if clerks who are more politically extreme—and
thus unrepresentative of the clerks hired by a particular judge—are the ones most
likely to donate.
As an initial matter, the nature of the CBI scores may counsel in favor
of relying on a dataset with non-random missingness in the clerks’ CFscores. There
are two reasons for this. The first speaks to clerks’ twin incentives in both making
political donations and also seeking clerkship employment. Logically, a clerk who
holds ideological views strongly enough so as to make a political donation (and thus
show up in DIME) will be more likely to also consider judicial ideology in finding a
suitable clerkship. That is, clerks making political donations will be those most likely
to engage in ideological sorting in terms of which judges they apply to for clerkships.
This suggests that those clerks appearing in DIME, and thus constituting the basis
of the CBI scores, will also be those whose ideology corresponds most strongly with
those of the judge for whom they work. (To put this differently, a clerk who donates
no amount to any kind of political will also likely be one for whom politics tend
not to matter; such a clerk might be less concerned about finding an “ideological
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match” with his or her hiring judge, suggesting a weaker predictive correspondence
between his or her ideology and the judges’ ideology.) This reasoning suggests that
non-random missingness in the clerks’ CFscores may actually serve to make the CBI
scores more precise and reduce random noise coming from politically disinterested
clerkship applicants, who place little or no weight on finding an ideological match.
There is no way, however, to test this possibility because we do not have access to
the missing information.
The second rationale for excluding missing clerks concerns the judges’ in-
centive in hiring (as opposed to the clerks’ incentives). If judges have an incentive to
hire those who are ideologically like-minded, as our discussion above suggests, then
we may also think that the clerkship experience will further the clerks’ ideological
trajectory. For example, suppose a conservative judge hires both conservative and
liberal law clerks; in this case, the ideological correspondence between the judge and
his or her conservative clerks may lead them to be more active donors, more net-
worked in conservative legal circles, and more likely to continue on a conservative
trajectory. Conversely, for the liberal clerks, clerking for a conservative judge (with
whom the ideological connection was already quite weak) might lead them to be less
politically active and thus less likely to show up in DIME. Again, just like the first
possibility, however, we have no means of testing such a possibility.
These reasons counsel us toward using CBI scores that drop missing clerks.
However, as a robustness check, we impute missing CFscores for clerks using the
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missForest R package (Stekhoven and Buhlmann, 2012). The procedure imputes
missing values by fitting random forest models in an iterative fashion. It is a non-
parametric machine-learning approach that accounts for nonlinearities and interac-
tions between variables. It also handles datasets in which more than one variable
is only partially observed. The accuracy of the imputed values is assessed based on
out-of-bag error between observed and imputed values.
We include the following variables in the imputation model: (1) gender, (2)
law school attended, (3) state in which the hiring judge is located, (4) the judge’s own
estimated CFscore, and (5) the identity of the president who appointed the hiring
judge. For clerks we include variables capturing (6) age at the time of appointment,
(7) year of birth, (8) employment type, (9) current state of residence, and (10) parti-
sanship of congressional district.16 The model imputes clerk CFscores with reasonable
accuracy. The out-of-bag mean square error is 0.29 and a Pearson correlation of 0.64.
We estimate CBI scores for judges using the imputed clerk CFscores as
before, normalized by the actual CBI score mean and standard deviation. Figure 6
plots actual CBI scores versus CBI scores generated using imputed clerk CFscores. To
demonstrate the extent that selection into the donor pool influences CBI scores, Table
6 repeats the analysis from Table 5, but where the most liberal and conservative circuit
court judges are ordered by imputed CBI scores. The results are broadly similar, in
16Note that these variables are not observed for all clerks. See Bonica et al. (2016)
for a more detailed description of the dataset and how we obtained these additional
variables for clerks.
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that all but one of the top 15 most liberal judges according to the imputed scores were
in the top 30 most liberal judges when ranked according to the non-imputed scores,
and all but two of the top 15 most conservative judges according to the imputed
scores were among the top 30 most conservative judges when ranked according to the
non-imputed scores. Similarly, Table 7 shows that the ordering the Supreme Court
Justices by imputed CBI score does not greatly affect the ranking of Supreme Court
Justices, as described in Table 3. The exceptions are Justices Kagan and Sotomayor,
who have the largest differences between their actual and imputed CBI scores. This
is due to the fact that they have a relatively high proportion of clerks with missing
CFscores because they are new to the court and recent clerks are less likely to have
made a donation.
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Figure 6: CBI Score with Actual versus Imputed Clerk Donations
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Table 6: Robustness Check: The Most Liberal and Conservative Circuit Court Judges
based on CBI Scores
Rank Appointing CBI Score
Imputed Actual Judge Name Circuit Party Actual Imputed
1 1 Fletcher, William A 9 D -1.40 -1.37
2 3 Berzon, Marsha S 9 D -1.35 -1.36
3 2 Reinhardt, Stephen R 9 D -1.36 -1.36
4 12 Wardlaw, Kim Mclane 9 D -1.20 -1.30
5 7 Pregerson, Harry 9 D -1.23 -1.29
6 13 Graber, Susan P 9 D -1.19 -1.26
7 21 Fuentes, Julio M 9 D -1.07 -1.25
8 20 Hall, Cynthia Holcomb 9 R -1.08 -1.25
9 27 Fisher, Raymond C 9 D -1.00 -1.24
10 26 Mckeown, M Margaret 9 D -1.00 -1.23
11 14 Wood, Diane P 7 D -1.18 -1.22
12 10 Murnaghan, Francis D Jr 4 D -1.20 -1.22
13 24 Calabresi, Guido 2 D -1.03 -1.21
14 22 Tatel, David S DC D -1.07 -1.21
15 43 Straub, Chester J 2 D -0.86 -1.20
178 155 Jolly, Grady E 5 R 0.97 0.10
179 175 Dubina, Joel F 11 R 1.41 0.11
180 151 Wilkins, Willliam W Jr 4 R 0.86 0.11
181 177 Coffey, John L 7 R 1.46 0.11
182 181 Suhrheinrich, Richard F 6 R 1.84 0.14
183 185 Nelson, David A 6 R 2.09 0.18
184 189 Smith, D Brooks 3 R 2.42 0.24
185 182 Jones, Edith H 5 R 1.88 0.27
186 191 Edmondson, J L 11 R 2.50 0.36
187 179 Miner, Roger J 2 R 1.75 0.38
188 188 Alito, Samuel A 3 R 2.35 0.40
189 186 Williams, Karen Johnson 4 R 2.17 0.41
190 187 Luttig, J Michael 4 R 2.29 0.61
191 190 Shedd, Dennis W 4 R 2.45 0.61
192 192 Magill, Frank 8 R 2.87 0.67
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Table 7: Robustness Check: CBI Scores for Supreme Court Justices
Rank Appointing CBI Score
Imputed Actual Justice Name Party Actual Imputed
1 6 Ginsburg, Ruth Bader D -0.79 -0.88
2 2 Breyer, Stephen D -1.00 -0.71
3 9 Marshall, Thurgood D -0.59 -0.61
4 4 Fortas, Abe D -0.90 -0.59
5 10 Frankfurter, Felix D -0.49 -0.49
6 7 Blackmun, Harry A R -0.63 -0.47
7 5 Souter, David R -0.81 -0.43
8 8 Stevens, John Paul R -0.63 -0.33
9 11 Brennan, William J R -0.37 -0.28
10 12 Stewart, Potter R -0.19 -0.19
11 1 Kagan, Elena D -1.59 -0.12
12 13 Harlan, John M R -0.18 -0.12
13 16 White, Byron R D 0.00 -0.04
14 14 O’Connor, Sandra Day R -0.16 0.00
15 3 Sotomayor, Sonia D -0.94 0.03
16 15 Douglas, William O D -0.05 0.03
17 17 Powell, Lewis F R 0.05 0.11
18 21 Clark, Tom C D 0.42 0.35
19 19 Warren, Earl R 0.38 0.35
20 20 Black, Hugo L D 0.41 0.44
21 18 Reed, Stanley D 0.13 0.45
22 22 Goldberg, Arthur J D 0.77 0.46
23 24 Burger, Warren E R 0.85 0.75
24 23 Roberts, John R 0.85 0.82
25 26 Rehnquist, William R 1.28 1.10
26 27 Scalia, Antonin R 1.67 1.33
27 25 Kennedy, Anthony R 1.26 1.42
28 28 Alito, Samuel R 2.36 1.67
29 29 Thomas, Clarence R 2.43 2.03
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8 Conclusion
The accurate estimation of judicial ideology represents an important initial
step in understanding judicial decisionmaking, judicial behavior, and strategic moves
by other branches of government in shaping the judiciary. In this paper we have
introduced a new measure of judicial ideology, Clerk-Based Ideology (CBI) scores,
that uses the ideology of judges’ law clerks as a proxy for judicial ideology itself.
CBI scores offer three important advantages over existing measures. First,
because district, circuit, and Supreme Court judges all hire law clerks, CBI scores
can be calculated for judges across the judicial hierarchy. This allows us to avoid the
potential problems associated with votes-based measures, which rely on judges voting
on the same case together. The votes-based measures are very difficult to estimate for
district and circuit court judges, who tend to hear cases in smaller groups or, in the
case of district judges, by themselves. Second, CBI scores take advantage of a process
that repeats on a yearly cycle: law clerk hiring. This allows us to estimate judicial
ideology in a dynamic fashion, with ideological estimates that vary over time. This
is an improvement over other measures of lower-court ideology, such as those relying
on the identities of appointing actors, which are, by their very nature, fundamentally
static. Lastly, CBI scores do not rely on judges’ votes or votes-based outcomes, which,
although useful in many contexts, may be susceptible to case selection, bargaining, or
other strategic behavior. By contrast, CBI scores are based directly on revealed pref-
erences of important hiring decisions, and there are good reasons to believe ideology
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plays a large role in who judges hire.
Several limitations are important to keep in mind when working with CBI
scores. First, although we have argued that clerk ideology typically serves as a useful
proxy for judicial ideology, there are likely certain judges for whom the correspondence
is weak or non-existent. Some judges may hire clerks without regard to ideology and
appeal to clerks from across the ideological spectrum. Some judges may even seek out
an ideologically opposed “counter-clerk,” whose ideology is diammetrically opposed
to the judge’s ideology. In such cases, CBI scores will represent a particularly noisy
measure of the judge’s ideology and may be biased towards making the judge appear
more moderate than he or she truly is.
A related limitation concerns the issue of selection, and particularly the
fact that the clerk donations used to construct the CBI scores are only available for
the clerks who chose to donate, and as discussed above, the clerks who donate may
differ from those clerks who do not. To the extent that selection into the donating
population is driven by clerks’ observable characteristics, the imputation approach
we utilize in Part 7 provides an adequate correction. However, if donating clerks
differ from non-donating clerks in unobservable ways, the imputation approach will
fail to fully correct for this bias. Nonetheless, the fact that CBI scores correspond so
closely to other measures of judicial ideology suggests that such selection problems,
if present, should not be taken to fully undermine confidence in the CBI scores.
With these limitations in mind, we hope the novel capabilities of our mea-
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sure will allow researchers to ask and answer a variety of interesting questions previ-
ously unexplored. We envision these to include inquiries that leverage the temporal
component of judicial ideology, including whether judges drift ideologically over time,
whether they respond to exogenous shocks presented to them by the other branches
of government, and whether they are responsive to public opinion.
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Table A1: Circuit Court Judges CBI Scores (and standard errors)
Judge Name (Circuit) CBI Score Judge Name (Circuit) CBI Score Judge Name (Circuit) CBI Score
Alito, Samuel A (3) 2.35 (0.36) Clement, Edith Brown (5) 0.98 (0.64) Ginsburg, Douglas H (DC) 0.28 (0.44)
Ambro, Thomas L (3) 0.11 (0.66) Clevenger, Raymond (FC) -0.73 (0.46) Gould, Ronald M (9) 0.16 (0.84)
Anderson, R Lanier (5) 0.33 (0.43) Clifton, Richard R (9) 0.52 (1.00) Graber, Susan P (9) -1.19 (0.12)
Anderson, Stephen H (10) -0.13 (0.37) Coffey, John L (7) 1.46 (0.59) Greenberg, Morton I (3) -0.33 (0.33)
Archer, Glenn L Jr (FC) 0.60 (0.70) Cole, R Guy Jr (6) -0.56 (0.26) Gregory, Roger L (4) -1.15 (0.13)
Arnold, Morris S (8) 0.55 (0.49) Cummings, Walter J (7) -0.69 (0.72) Hall, Cynthia Holcomb (9) -1.08 (0.20)
Arnold, Richard S (8) -0.47 (0.30) Cyr, Conrad K (1) -0.22 (0.89) Hamilton, Clyde H (4) 0.24 (0.76)
Baldock, Bobby R (10) 0.78 (0.70) Daughtrey, Martha Craig (6) -0.96 (0.23) Hansen, David R (8) 1.08 (0.53)
Barkett, Rosemary (11) -0.74 (0.18) Davis, W Eugene (5) 0.11 (0.45) Hartz, Harris L (10) -0.49 (1.08)
Barksdale, Rhesa H (5) 0.27 (0.88) Demoss, Harold R Jr (5) 0.70 (0.61) Hatchett, Joseph (5) -0.31 (0.57)
Barry, Maryanne Trump (3) -0.52 (0.40) Dennis, James L (5) 0.55 (0.47) Hawkins, Michael Daly (9) 0.26 (0.44)
Batchelder, Alice M (6) 1.17 (0.51) Dubina, Joel F (11) 1.41 (0.59) Henderson, Karen (DC) 0.59 (0.55)
Bea, Carlos T (9) 0.20 (0.76) Duhe, John M Jr (5) -0.24 (0.67) Higginbotham, Patrick E (5) 1.17 (0.29)
Beam, Clarence Arlen (8) 1.23 (0.76) Dyk, Timothy B (FC) -0.97 (0.45) Hug, Procter Jr (9) -0.08 (0.40)
Becker, Edward R (3) -1.22 (0.11) Easterbrook, Frank H (7) -0.37 (0.50) Hull, Frank Mays (5) 0.12 (0.48)
Beezer, Robert R (9) 0.10 (0.95) Ebel, David M (10) -0.56 (0.32) Jacobs, Dennis G (2) 0.29 (0.42)
Benavides, Fortunato P (5) -0.84 (0.32) Edmondson, J L (11) 2.50 (0.51) Jolly, Grady E (5) 0.97 (0.70)
Berzon, Marsha S (9) -1.35 (0.12) Edwards, Harry T (DC) -1.21 (0.10) Jones, Edith H (5) 1.88 (0.39)
Birch, Stanley Francis Jr (11) -0.37 (0.45) Ervin, Sam J (4) -0.90 (0.34) Kanne, Michael S (7) 0.57 (0.56)
Black, Susan Harrell (11) 0.07 (0.45) Evans, Terence T (7) 0.37 (0.58) Katzmann, Robert Allen (2) -0.73 (0.35)
Boggs, Danny J (6) 0.89 (0.44) Fagg, George G (8) -0.21 (0.00) Kearse, Amalya L (2) -0.56 (0.23)
Boudin, Michael (1) -0.97 (0.12) Fernandez, Ferdinand (9) -0.29 (0.46) Kelly, Paul J Jr (10) 0.62 (0.69)
Bowman, Pasco M Ii (8) -0.30 (0.37) Fisher, Raymond C (9) -1.00 (0.25) Kennedy, Cornelia G (6) 0.34 (0.76)
Briscoe, Mary Beck (10) 0.65 (0.72) Flaum, Joel M (9) -0.68 (0.39) King, Carolyn Dineen (5) -0.10 (0.33)
Brorby, Wade (10) 0.17 (0.60) Fletcher, Betty Binns (9) -1.08 (0.22) King, Robert B (4) -0.94 (0.20)
Browning, James R (9) -1.28 (0.07) Fletcher, William A (9) -1.40 (0.11) Kleinfeld, Andrew J (9) 0.36 (0.48)
Brunetti, Melvin T (9) -0.32 (0.50) Fuentes, Julio M (9) -1.07 (0.21) Kozinski, Alex (9) 1.13 (0.51)
Bryson, William C (FC) 1.53 (0.43) Garjarsa, Arthur J (FC) 0.58 (0.60) Leavy, Edward (9) 1.43 (0.84)
Bye, Kermit Edward (8) 0.21 (0.80) Garland, Merrick B (DC) -0.54 (0.37) Leval, Pierre N (2) -0.84 (0.17)
Cabranes, Jose A (2) -0.16 (0.40) Garwood, Will (5) 1.18 (0.73) Lewis, Timothy K (3) -1.12 (0.17)
Calabresi, Guido (2) -1.03 (0.20) Garza, Emilio M (5) 0.03 (0.34) Lipez, Kermit Victor (1) -0.74 (0.33)
Carnes, Edward Earl (11) 0.51 (0.34) Gibbons, Julia Smith (6) -1.29 (0.21) Loken, James B (8) 1.05 (0.57)
Clay, Eric Lee (6) -0.35 (0.28) Gilman, Ronald Lee (6) -0.57 (0.25) Lourie, Alan D (FC) -0.24 (0.52)
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Table A1: (cont.) Circuit Court Judges CBI Scores (and standard errors)
Judge Name (Circuit) CBI Score Judge Name (Circuit) CBI Score Judge Name (Circuit) CBI Score
Lucero, Carlos F (10) -0.44 (0.27) Pooler, Rosemary S (2) -0.95 (0.17) Stewart, Carl E (5) -0.13 (0.49)
Luttig, J Michael (4) 2.29 (0.30) Posner, Richard A (7) 0.34 (0.48) Straub, Chester J (2) -0.86 (0.18)
Lynch, Sandra Lea (1) -0.57 (0.34) Pregerson, Harry (9) -1.23 (0.13) Suhrheinrich, Richard F (6) 1.84 (0.65)
Magill, Frank (8) 2.87 (0.88) Rader, Randall R (FC) 0.89 (0.52) Tacha, Deanell Reece (10) -0.02 (0.46)
Manion, Daniel A (7) 1.36 (0.34) Randolph, A Raymond (DC) -0.68 (0.39) Tallman, Richard C (9) -1.17 (0.17)
Martin, Boyce F Jr (6) -0.19 (0.25) Rawlinson, Johnnie B (9) 0.25 (0.89) Tashima, A Wallace (9) -0.82 (0.20)
Mayer, Haidane Robert (FC) 0.74 (0.51) Reinhardt, Stephen R (9) -1.36 (0.07) Tatel, David S (DC) -1.07 (0.09)
Mckee, Theodore A (3) -0.84 (0.46) Rendell, Marjorie O (3) -0.82 (0.35) Thomas, Sidney R (9) -0.92 (0.26)
Mckeown, M Margaret (9) -1.00 (0.17) Rich, Giles S (FC) 1.91 (0.01) Thompson, David R (9) -1.20 (0.16)
Mcmillian, Theodore (8) -0.81 (0.16) Ripple, Kenneth F (7) 0.97 (0.49) Tjoflat, Gerald Bard (5) -0.11 (0.44)
Merritt, Gilbert S (6) 0.09 (0.53) Rogers, John M (6) -0.56 (1.07) Torruella, Juan R (1) -0.67 (0.18)
Michael, M Blane (4) -0.09 (0.41) Rogers, Judith W (DC) -0.93 (0.27) Trott, Stephen S (9) 0.09 (0.51)
Michel, Paul R (FC) 0.52 (0.50) Roth, Jane R (3) -0.94 (0.26) Tymkovich, Timothy M (10) 1.29 (1.09)
Milburn, H Ted (6) 1.22 (0.71) Rovner, Ilana Diamond (7) -0.50 (0.03) Wald, Patricia M (DC) -1.06 (0.15)
Miner, Roger J (2) 1.75 (0.93) Ryan, James L (6) -0.10 (0.56) Walker, John M Jr (2) -0.91 (0.17)
Moore, Karen Nelson (6) -1.02 (0.13) Rymer, Pamela Ann (9) 0.27 (0.47) Wardlaw, Kim Mclane (9) -1.20 (0.19)
Motz, Diana Gribbon (4) -0.91 (0.22) Sack, Robert David (2) -0.93 (0.36) Widener, H Emory Jr (4) 1.34 (0.58)
Murnaghan, Francis D Jr (4) -1.20 (0.14) Schall, Alvin Anthony (FC) 0.99 (0.72) Wiener, Jacques L Jr (5) 0.28 (0.49)
Murphy, Diana E (8) -1.10 (0.14) Schroeder, Mary M (9) -0.65 (0.47) Wilkins, Willliam W Jr (4) 0.86 (0.32)
Murphy, Michael R (10) -1.25 (0.15) Scirica, Anthony J (3) -0.59 (0.32) Wilkinson, J Harvie (4) 1.33 (0.42)
Nelson, David A (6) 2.09 (0.89) Selya, Bruce M (1) -0.81 (0.20) Williams, Ann Claire (7) -0.64 (0.41)
Nelson, Thomas G (9) -0.82 (0.38) Sentelle, David B (DC) 1.13 (0.54) Williams, Karen Johnson (4) 2.17 (0.33)
Newman, Pauline (FC) 0.28 (0.48) Shedd, Dennis W (4) 2.45 (0.42) Williams, Stephen F (DC) -0.96 (0.11)
Niemeyer, Paul V (4) -0.19 (0.37) Silberman, Laurence H (DC) 1.76 (0.50) Wilson, Charles R (11) -0.20 (0.27)
Noonan, John T Jr (9) 0.03 (0.97) Siler, Eugene E Jr (6) 1.88 (0.72) Winter, Ralph K (2) -0.01 (0.38)
Norris, Alan E (6) 0.77 (0.48) Silverman, Barry G (9) 0.24 (0.76) Wollman, Roger L (8) 0.22 (0.71)
Nygaard, Richard L (3) 1.16 (0.47) Sloviter, Dolores K (3) -0.15 (0.73) Wood, Diane P (7) -1.18 (0.14)
Oscannlain, Diarmuid F (9) 1.15 (0.37) Smith, D Brooks (3) 2.42 (0.48)
Paez, Richard A (9) -0.57 (0.51) Smith, Jerry E (5) 1.37 (0.41)
Parker, Fred I (2) -0.99 (0.21) Smith, Lavenski R (8) -0.42 (0.29)
Parker, Robert M (5) 0.06 (0.49) Sotomayor, Sonia (2) -0.95 (0.29)
Plager, Jay S (FC) 1.06 (0.42) Stahl, Norman H (1) -0.83 (0.31)
Politz, Henry A (5) -0.08 (0.36) Stapleton, Walter K (3) 0.47 (0.61)
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Table A2: District Court Judges CBI Scores (and standard errors)
Judge Name (District) CBI Score Judge Name (District) CBI Score Judge Name (District) CBI Score
Adams, Henry Lee Jr (OH ND) 0.39 (0.70) Bissell, John W (NJ ST) -0.68 (0.30) Camp, Jack T (GA ND) 0.25 (0.36)
Adelman, Lynn (WI ED) -0.90 (0.23) Black, Bruce D (NM ST) -0.56 (0.64) Campbell, Tena (UT ST) -0.94 (0.30)
Alesia, James H (IL ND) 0.78 (0.99) Blackkburn, Sharon (AL ND) 0.27 (0.50) Caputo, A Richard (PA MD) -0.39 (0.51)
Alsup, William Haskell (CA ND) 0.29 (1.14) Blake, Catherine C (MD ST) -0.54 (0.48) Carnes, Julie E (GA ND) 0.13 (0.66)
Amon, Carol Bagley (NY ED) -0.85 (0.15) Block, Frederic (NY ED) -0.32 (0.30) Carr, James Gray (OH ND) -0.32 (0.41)
Andersen, Wayne R (IL ND) -0.05 (0.42) Borman, Paul D (MI ED) 1.27 (0.47) Carter, David O (CA CD) -1.20 (0.11)
Anderson, G Ross Jr (SC ST) 0.66 (0.25) Bowen, Dudley H Jr (GA SD) 0.68 (0.23) Carter, Gene (ME ST) 0.62 (1.32)
Anderson, Joseph F Jr (SC ST) 0.03 (0.25) Boyle, Terrene W (NC ED) 1.45 (0.50) Casellas, Salvador E (PR ST) 0.30 (0.87)
Armstrong, Saundra (CA ND) -1.17 (0.22) Bramlette, David C Iii (MS SD) 0.11 (0.81) Casey, Richard (NY SD) 1.07 (0.66)
Arterton, Janet Bond (CT ST) -1.44 (0.07) Breyer, Charles R (CA ND) -1.22 (0.08) Castillo, Ruben (IL ND) -0.66 (0.48)
Aspen, Marvin E (IL ND) 1.29 (0.64) Brieant, Charles L (NY SD) -0.30 (0.55) Cauthron, Robin J (OK WD) 0.13 (0.40)
Atlas, Nancy Friedman (TX SD) 0.30 (0.10) Brimmer, Clarence A (WY ST) 1.30 (0.64) Cebull, Richard F (MT ST) -0.91 (0.02)
Babcock, Lewis (CO ST) -1.13 (0.12) Brinkema, Leonle M (VA ED) -0.55 (0.33) Cerezo, Carmen (PR ST) -0.91 (0.19)
Baer, Harold Jr (NY SD) -0.68 (0.17) Briones, David (TX WD) 0.46 (0.19) Chasanow, Deborah (MD ST) -0.15 (0.38)
Baird, Lourdes G (CA CD) -0.53 (0.50) Broadwater, W Craig (WV ND) -0.41 (0.39) Chatigny, Robert N (CT ST) -0.16 (0.36)
Barbadoro, Paul James (NH ST) -0.17 (0.52) Brody, Anita B (PA ED) -0.05 (0.40) Chesler, Stanley R (NJ ST) -1.00 (0.32)
Barbour, William H Jr (MS SD) 0.79 (0.74) Brody, Morton Aaron (ME ST) 0.71 (0.89) Chesney, Maxine M (CA ND) -0.74 (0.52)
Barker, Sarah Evans (IN SD) -0.10 (0.55) Broomfield, Robert C (AZ ST) -1.08 (0.11) Chin, Denny (NY SD) -0.55 (0.48)
Barnes, Harry F (AR WD) 0.76 (0.72) Brown, Anna J (OR ST) -0.47 (0.81) Cindrich, Robert J (PA WD) -0.36 (0.00)
Barry, Maryanne Trump (NJ ST) -0.97 (0.16) Brown, Garrett E Jr (NJ ST) 1.87 (0.22) Cleland, Robert (MI ED) 1.97 (0.53)
Bartle, Harvey III (PA ED) -0.39 (0.57) Brown, Paul N (TX ED) 1.45 (0.60) Clement, Edith B (LA ED) 1.19 (0.65)
Bartlett, D Brook (MO WD) -0.12 (0.43) Bryan, Robert J (WA WD) 1.88 (1.02) Clemon, U W (AL ND) -0.96 (0.28)
Bassler, William G (NJ ST) -0.41 (0.74) Buchmeyer, Jerry (TX ND) -0.33 (0.46) Coar, David H (IL ND) -0.73 (0.32)
Bates, John D (DC ST) 1.35 (0.70) Buchwald, Naomi (NY SD) -0.79 (0.31) Cobb, Howell (TX ED) 2.06 (0.62)
Battey, Richard Howard (SD ST) 3.33 (0.06) Bucklew, Susan (FL MD) 0.02 (0.31) Cohn, Avern (MI ED) -0.64 (0.58)
Batts, Deborah A (NY SD) -1.32 (0.11) Bucklo, Elane E (IL ND) -0.10 (0.40) Collier, Curtis L (TN ED) 0.41 (0.70)
Beaty, James A Jr (NC MD) 0.43 (0.50) Buckwalter, Ronald L (PA ED) 1.24 (0.75) Collier, Lacey A (TN ED) 0.72 (0.37)
Beistline, Ralph R (AK ST) 2.71 (0.09) Bullock, Frank W Jr (NC MD) 1.74 (0.75) Collins, Audrey B (CA CD) -1.03 (0.27)
Belot, Monti L (KS ST) 0.67 (0.78) Burgess, Franklin (WA WD) -0.79 (0.55) Collins, Raner C (AZ ST) -1.77 (0.07)
Benson, Dee (UT ST) 1.71 (0.50) Burrage, Michael (OK WD) 3.17 (0.00) Conlon, Suzanne B (IL ND) 0.86 (0.55)
Berman, Richard M (NY SD) -0.44 (0.29) Burrell, Garland E Jr (CA ED) -0.19 (0.60) Conmy, Patrick A (ND ST) 0.18 (0.00)
Berrigan, Helen Ginger (LA ED) -0.39 (0.48) Butler, Charles R Jr (AL SD) 0.04 (0.38) Conway, Anne C (FL MD) -0.85 (0.28)
Bertelsman, William O (KY ED) 1.51 (0.82) Cahn, Edward N (PA ED) -0.24 (0.59) Conway, John E (NM ST) -1.14 (0.06)
48
Table A2: (cont.) District Court Judges CBI Scores (and standard errors)
Judge Name (District) CBI Score Judge Name (District) CBI Score Judge Name (District) CBI Score
Cooper, Clarence (GA ND) -0.79 (0.19) Dwyer, William L (WA WD) -0.23 (1.04) Gertner, Nancy (MA ST) -0.90 (0.26)
Cooper, Florence (CA CD) -0.70 (0.44) Echols, Robert L (TN MD) 0.43 (0.84) Gex, Walter J Iii (MS SD) 1.48 (0.74)
Cooper, Mary L (NJ ST) -0.92 (0.23) Economus, Peter C (OH ND) -0.48 (0.15) Gibbons, Julia S (TN WD) 0.15 (0.61)
Cote, Denise (NY SD) -0.33 (0.42) Edenfield, Berry (GA SD) 0.87 (0.58) Gilbert, J Phil (IL SD) 1.14 (0.75)
Coughenour, John (WA WD) -0.44 (0.47) Edgar, R Allan (TN ED) -0.69 (0.27) Giles, James T (PA ED) -1.15 (0.24)
Covello, Alfred (CT ST) 1.54 (0.43) Ellis, T S Iii (VA ED) -0.51 (0.42) Gillmor, Helen W (HI ST) -0.52 (0.52)
Crabb, Barbara B (WI WD) -0.68 (0.17) Ellison, Keith Paty (TX SD) -1.63 (0.01) Gilmore, Vanessa D (TX SD) -0.36 (0.49)
Cummings, Samuel (TX ND) 2.47 (0.43) Enslen, Richard A (MI WD) -0.85 (0.03) Gleeson, John (NY ED) -0.56 (0.29)
Currie, Mcgowan (SC ST) 0.75 (0.65) Evans, Orinda D (GA ND) 1.15 (0.67) Gold, Alan Stephen (FL SD) -0.59 (0.40)
Dalzell, Stewart (PA ED) -1.03 (0.28) Faber, David A (WV SD) 1.43 (0.61) Gonzalez, Irma E (CA SD) -1.37 (0.12)
Damrell, Frank C Jr (CA ED) 0.56 (0.50) Fallon, Eldon E (LA ED) 1.48 (0.88) Goodwin, Joseph (WV SD) 0.15 (0.52)
Daniel, Wiley Y (CO ST) -1.13 (0.13) Farnan, Joseph J Jr (DE ST) 2.41 (0.26) Gorton, Nathaniel (MA ST) -0.60 (0.29)
Davidson, Glen H (MS ND) 1.03 (0.69) Fawsett, Patricia C (FL MD) -0.26 (0.24) Graham, Donald L (FL SD) 0.16 (0.04)
Davis, Andre M (MD ST) -0.98 (0.12) Feldman, Martin L C (LA ED) -0.55 (0.54) Greenaway, J A Jr (NJ ST) -0.88 (0.38)
Davis, Edward B (FL SD) -0.45 (0.37) Fenner, Gary A (MO WD) 0.34 (0.67) Griesa, Thomas P (NY SD) -0.92 (0.29)
Davis, Michael J (MN ST) -1.08 (0.32) Fish, A Joe (TX ND) 0.71 (0.44) Gwin, James S (OH ND) -0.59 (0.56)
Dawson, Robert T (AR WD) 2.03 (0.48) Fitzpatrick, Duross (GA MD) -0.04 (0.57) Haden, Charles H Jr (WV SD) -0.35 (0.31)
Dearie, Raymond J (NY ED) -0.98 (0.16) Fitzwater, Sidney A (TX ND) 1.78 (0.58) Haggerty, Ancer Lee (OR ST) -1.15 (0.16)
Dement, Ira (AL MD) 0.22 (0.48) Folsom, David (TX ED) 0.16 (0.53) Haight, Charles S Jr (NY SD) -0.08 (0.34)
Diclerico, Joseph A Jr (NH ST) 0.78 (0.58) Forester, Karl S (KY ED) 1.34 (0.41) Hall, Janet Celeste (CT ST) -0.66 (0.28)
Dimitrouleas, William (FL SD) 1.64 (0.69) Forrester, J Owen (GA ND) 2.15 (0.51) Hamilton, David F (IN SD) -0.46 (0.56)
Dimmick, Carolyn R (WA WD) 0.43 (0.89) Frank, Donovan W (MN ST) 1.94 (0.88) Hamilton, Jean C (MO ED) -0.57 (0.32)
Dlott, Susan J (OH SD) -0.72 (0.15) Friedman, Bernard A (MI ED) -0.28 (0.42) Hamilton, Phyllis J (CA ND) -1.48 (0.10)
Doherty, Rebecca F (LA WD) 1.50 (0.37) Friedman, Paul L (DC ST) -1.40 (0.08) Harmon, Melinda F (TX SD) -0.36 (0.34)
Dominguez, Daniel R (PR ST) 0.93 (0.70) Furgeson, W Royal (TX WD) -0.41 (0.43) Harrington, Ed F (MA ST) -0.20 (0.54)
Donald, Bernice B (TN WD) -1.14 (0.17) Fuste, Jose Antonio (PR ST) -1.02 (0.31) Hatter, Terry J Jr (CA CD) -0.07 (0.00)
Dorsey, Peter C (CT ST) -1.17 (0.27) Gadola, Paul V (MI ED) 0.63 (0.76) Head, Hayden W Jr (TX SD) 1.96 (0.67)
Doty, David S (MN ST) 1.44 (1.08) Garaufis, Nicholas G (NY ED) -0.96 (0.23) Heartfield, Thad (TX ED) 1.24 (0.38)
Droney, Christopher (CT ST) 0.32 (0.68) Garbis, Marvin (MD ST) -0.02 (0.46) Hellerstein, Alvin K (NY SD) -0.61 (0.45)
Dubois, Jan E (PA ED) -0.34 (0.79) Garcia, Hipolito (TX WD) 2.65 (0.22) Henderson, Thelton (CA ND) -1.14 (0.33)
Duffy, Kevin Thomas (NY SD) -0.20 (0.55) Garcia, Orlando (TX WD) -0.60 (0.00) Hendren, J L (AR WD) 0.07 (0.05)
Duffy, Patrick (SC ST) -0.15 (0.27) Garcia-Gregory, Jay (PR ST) -0.90 (0.22) Herlong, Henry M Jr (SC ST) 1.98 (0.36)
Duggan, Patrick J (MI ED) 0.48 (0.42) Gershon, Nina (NY ED) -1.08 (0.16) Herndon, David R (IL SD) -0.06 (1.08)
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Table A2: (cont.) District Court Judges CBI Scores (and standard errors)
Judge Name (District) CBI Score Judge Name (District) CBI Score Judge Name (District) CBI Score
Heyburn, John (KY WD) 0.23 (0.75) Jackson, Thomas (DC ST) 0.96 (0.95) Koeltl, John G (NY SD) -1.48 (0.07)
Hibbler, William J (IL ND) 1.37 (0.82) Jenkins, Martin J (CA ND) -1.04 (0.22) Kollar-Kotelly, C (DC ST) -1.42 (0.05)
Higgins, Thomas A (TN MD) 0.26 (1.00) Jensen, D Lowell (CA ND) -0.51 (0.46) Kopf, Richard G (NE ST) -0.48 (0.01)
Highsmith, Shelby (FL SD) 2.81 (0.38) Johnson, Alan B (WY ST) 2.18 (0.00) Korman, Edward R (NY ED) -1.14 (0.68)
Hilton, Claude M (VA ED) 1.14 (0.81) Johnson, Norma (DC ST) 0.12 (0.81) Kovachevich, E A (FL MD) 1.81 (0.85)
Hinkle, Robert Lewis (FL ND) -1.00 (0.27) Johnson, Sterling Jr (NY ED) -0.91 (0.20) Kyle, Richard H (MN ST) -1.12 (0.42)
Hinojosa, Ricardo H (TX SD) 2.51 (0.39) Jones, Barbara S (NY SD) -0.22 (0.49) Laffitte, Hector M (PR ST) 0.00 (1.04)
Hogan, Michael R (OR ST) 1.02 (0.73) Jones, James Parker (VA WD) -0.88 (0.18) Lagueux, Ronald R (RI ST) -0.60 (0.56)
Hogan, Thomas F (DC ST) -0.26 (0.44) Jones, Napoleon A Jr (CA SD) -1.19 (0.18) Lamberth, Royce C (DC ST) 0.78 (0.86)
Holmes, Sven Erik (OK ND) -0.12 (0.40) Jones, Robert Edward (OR ST) 0.01 (0.69) Land, Clay D (GA MD) 0.72 (0.55)
Holschuh, John D (OH SD) -0.32 (0.07) Jordan, Adalberto (FL SD) -1.09 (0.19) Larimer, David G (NY WD) -0.31 (0.39)
Hood, Denise Page (MI ED) -0.42 (0.29) Joyner, J Curtis (PA ED) -0.37 (0.51) Lasnik, Robert S (WA WD) -0.94 (0.16)
Hood, Joseph M (KY ED) 0.60 (0.62) Justice, William (TX ED) -0.93 (0.47) Lawson, David M (MI ED) 2.65 (0.66)
Hornby, D Brock (ME ST) -0.55 (0.37) Kahn, Lawrence E (NY NE) -0.36 (0.19) Lazzara, Richard A (FL MD) 2.51 (0.28)
Houck, C Weston (SC ST) -0.27 (0.38) Kane, Yvette (PA MD) -0.19 (1.03) Lechner, Alfred J Jr (NJ ST) 1.15 (0.55)
Howard, George Jr (AR ED) -0.45 (0.00) Kaplan, Lewis A (NY SD) -0.32 (0.56) Lee, Gerald Bruce (VA ED) 0.37 (0.82)
Howard, Malcolm J (NC ED) 0.31 (0.75) Katz, Marvin (PA ED) -1.17 (0.27) Lee, Tom Stewart (MS SD) 1.04 (0.86)
Hoyt, Kenneth M (TX SD) 0.73 (0.53) Kauffman, Bruce W (PA ED) 0.11 (0.94) Legg, Benson E (MD ST) -0.28 (0.68)
Huck, Paul C (FL SD) 0.19 (0.32) Kay, Alan C (HI ST) 0.20 (0.60) Legge, Charles A (CA ND) -1.49 (0.12)
Hudspeth, Harry (TX WD) 0.97 (0.69) Kazen, George P (TX SD) -0.18 (0.46) Leinenweber, Harry D (IL ND) -0.42 (0.56)
Huff, Marilyn L (CA SD) -0.02 (0.56) Keeley, Irene M (WV ND) 1.35 (0.55) Leisure, Peter K (NY SD) 0.12 (0.65)
Hughes, Lynn (TX SD) 1.57 (0.59) Keep, Judith N (CA SD) 0.37 (1.14) Lemelle, Ivan L R (LA ED) 0.34 (0.61)
Hull, Thomas Gray (TN ED) 2.00 (0.00) Keeton, Robert E (MA ST) -0.09 (0.57) Lenard, Joan A (FL SD) -1.25 (0.09)
Hunt, Roger L (NV ST) 0.66 (0.78) Kendall, Joe (TX ND) -0.73 (0.22) Letts, J Spencer (CA CD) -0.91 (0.34)
Hunt, Willis B Jr (GA ND) 0.50 (0.50) Kennedy, Henry (DC ST) -0.70 (0.32) Levi, David F (CA ED) -0.60 (0.61)
Hupp, Harry L (CA CD) -0.93 (0.25) Kennelly, Matthew F (IL ND) -1.16 (0.19) Lew, Ronald S W (CA CD) -1.46 (0.27)
Hurley, Daniel T K (FL SD) 0.49 (0.45) Kent, Samuel B (TX SD) -0.19 (0.38) Lifland, John C (NJ ST) -0.33 (0.58)
Hutton, Herbert J (PA ED) 1.22 (0.63) Kern, Terry C (OK ND) -0.48 (0.43) Lindberg, George W (IL ND) 0.05 (0.50)
Illston, Susan Y (CA ND) -0.84 (0.33) Kessler, Gladys (DC ST) -0.58 (0.44) Lindsay, Reginald C (MA ST) -0.72 (0.50)
Irenas, Joseph E (NJ ST) -0.94 (0.23) Kimball, Dale A (UT ST) -1.01 (0.16) Little, F A Jr (LA WD) -0.30 (0.51)
Jack, Janis Graham (TX SD) 0.04 (1.02) King, Garr M (OR ST) -0.56 (0.01) Lodge, Edward J (ID ST) -0.86 (0.00)
Jackson, Carol E (MO ED) -1.24 (0.24) King, George H (CA CD) -1.29 (0.16) Longstaff, Ronald E (IA SD) 1.13 (0.99)
Jackson, Raymond (VA ED) -1.05 (0.17) Kocoras, Charles P (IL ND) -0.48 (0.36) Lovell, Charles C (MT ST) -0.10 (0.06)
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Judge Name (District) CBI Score Judge Name (District) CBI Score Judge Name (District) CBI Score
Lozano, Rudolpho (IN ND) 1.03 (0.68) Melancon, Tucker L (LA WD) 0.70 (0.90) Nickerson, William (MD ST) 0.05 (0.44)
Ludwig, Edmund V (PA ED) -0.06 (0.98) Melloy, Michael (IA ND) -0.88 (0.26) Nixon, John T (TN MD) -1.22 (0.31)
Lungstrum, John (KS ST) -0.56 (0.28) Merryday, Steven D (FL MD) 1.07 (0.61) Norgle, Charles (IL ND) -0.89 (0.47)
Lynn, Barbara M G (TX ND) 0.16 (1.03) Messitte, Peter J (MD ST) -0.92 (0.25) Norton, David C (SC ST) 0.41 (0.37)
Magnuson, Paul A (MN ST) -0.61 (0.23) Middlebrooks, Don (FL SD) -0.66 (0.16) Nowlin, James R (TX WD) 2.48 (0.36)
Manella, Nora M (CA CD) -1.24 (0.29) Mihm, Michael M (IL CD) -0.57 (0.15) Nugent, Donald C (OH ND) -0.23 (0.38)
Manning, Blanche M (IL ND) -1.18 (0.17) Miles, Vicki L (OK WD) 0.51 (0.38) Oliver, Solomon Jr (OH ND) -0.88 (0.21)
Marbley, Algenon L (OH SD) -1.00 (0.15) Miller, Robert L Jr (IN ND) 1.88 (0.71) Osteen, William (NC MD) 0.93 (0.37)
Marovich, George M (IL ND) -0.52 (0.21) Miller, Walker D (CO ST) 0.24 (0.24) Otoole, George A Jr (MA ST) -0.96 (0.21)
Marrero, Victor (NY SD) -0.39 (0.60) Mills, Michael P (MS ND) 0.69 (0.09) Padova, John R (PA ED) -0.59 (0.57)
Marshall, Consuelo B (CA CD) -1.06 (0.22) Mills, Richard (IL CD) -0.04 (0.97) Paez, Richard A (CA CD) -1.36 (0.26)
Marten, J Thomas (KS ST) 0.54 (0.66) Molloy, Donald W (MT ST) -0.88 (0.11) Pallmeyer, Rebecca R (IL ND) -1.10 (0.48)
Martin, Beverly B (GA ND) -0.49 (1.16) Mollway, Susan Oki (HI ST) -0.85 (0.35) Pannell, Charles Jr (GA ND) 2.06 (0.71)
Martin, John S Jr (NY SD) -1.37 (0.06) Montgomery, Ann D (MN ST) 0.00 (0.76) Parker, B D Jr (NY SD) -0.65 (0.59)
Martinez, Philip R (TX WD) 1.31 (0.71) Moody, James M (AR ED) 2.76 (0.24) Parker, James A (NM ST) -0.53 (0.20)
Matia, Paul R (OH ND) -0.80 (0.47) Moody, James S Jr (FL MD) 1.89 (0.25) Patel, Marilyn Hall (CA ND) -1.29 (0.08)
Matsch, Richard P (CO ST) 0.52 (0.78) Moon, Norman K (VA WD) -0.68 (0.15) Patterson, R P Jr (NY SD) -1.06 (0.12)
Matz, A Howard (CA CD) -1.00 (0.13) Moore, Michael K (FL SD) -0.37 (0.39) Paul, Maurice M (FL ND) 0.52 (0.50)
Mcauliffe, Steven (NH ST) -1.23 (0.02) Moore, William Jr (GA SD) -0.45 (0.30) Pauley, William H Iii (NY SD) 2.01 (0.50)
Mcavoy, Thomas J (NY ND) 0.75 (0.34) Mordue, Norman A (NY ND) 2.47 (0.00) Payne, Robert E (VA ED) 0.67 (0.64)
Mcbryde, John H (TX ND) 2.63 (0.23) Moreno, Federico A (FL SD) 0.71 (0.65) Pechman, Marsha (WA WD) -1.34 (0.12)
Mccalla, Jon P (TN WD) 0.04 (0.85) Morgan, Henry Jr (VA ED) 1.00 (0.80) Perry, Catherine D (MO ED) -0.73 (0.15)
Mcdade, Joe Billy (IL CD) 0.59 (0.75) Morrow, Margaret (CA CD) -1.03 (0.29) Phillips, Virginia A (CA CD) -1.56 (0.08)
Mckeague, David W (MI WD) 0.74 (0.91) Moskowitz, Barry T (CA SD) -0.81 (0.64) Piersol, Lawrence L (SD ST) -0.31 (0.30)
Mckelvie, Roderick R (DE ST) -0.33 (0.48) Motz, J Frederick (MD ST) -0.87 (0.21) Pisano, Joel A (NJ ST) 0.16 (0.85)
Mckenna, Lawrence (NY SD) -0.30 (0.43) Mukasey, Michael B (NY SD) -0.59 (0.49) Platt, Thomas C Jr (NY ED) 0.37 (0.88)
Mckibben, Howard D (NV ST) 0.54 (0.74) Mullen, Graham C (NC WD) -0.34 (1.08) Politan, Nicholas H (NJ ST) -1.17 (0.17)
Mckinley, Joseph Jr (KY WD) -0.13 (0.47) Munley, James M (PA MD) 0.45 (1.03) Polozola, Frank J (LA MD) 2.09 (0.21)
Mckinney, Larry J (IN SD) -0.15 (0.69) Murguia, Carlos (KS ST) -1.18 (0.39) Polster, Dan A (OH ND) -1.11 (0.00)
Mclaughlin, Mary A (PA ED) -1.53 (0.12) Murguia, Mary H (AZ ST) 0.45 (0.41) Ponsor, Michael A (MA ST) -0.59 (0.51)
Mcmahon, Colleen (NY SD) -0.36 (0.61) Murphy, G Patrick (IL SD) -0.97 (0.03) Porteous, G T Jr (LA ED) -0.43 (0.39)
Mcnamee, Stephen M (AZ ST) 1.12 (0.99) Murphy, Harold L (GA ND) 0.57 (0.59) Prado, Edward C (TX WD) -0.88 (0.41)
Means, Terry R (TX ND) 3.15 (0.36) Nelson, Edwin L (AL ND) 0.26 (0.58) Pratt, Robert W (IA SD) -0.69 (0.05)
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Judge Name (District) CBI Score Judge Name (District) CBI Score Judge Name (District) CBI Score
Pregerson, Dean D (CA CD) -0.84 (0.56) Scheindlin, Shira A (NY SD) -0.51 (0.15) Snyder, Christina A (CA CD) -0.68 (0.42)
Preska, Loretta A (NY SD) -0.56 (0.37) Schell, Richard A (TX ED) 0.43 (0.42) Solis, Jorge A (TX ND) 0.41 (0.72)
Pro, Philip M (NV ST) -0.38 (0.40) Schiller, Berie M (PA ED) -0.81 (0.25) Sotomayor, Sonia (NY SD) -0.87 (0.30)
Quist, Gordon J (MI WD) 0.72 (0.52) Schlesinger, Harvey (FL MD) 0.87 (0.62) Sparks, Sam (TX WD) -0.19 (0.25)
Raggi, Reena (NY ED) -0.28 (0.72) Schreier, Karen (SD ST) 0.37 (0.64) Sparr, Daniel B (CO ST) -0.87 (0.07)
Rainey, John D (TX SD) 1.11 (0.34) Schwartz, Allen G (NY SD) -0.91 (0.15) Spatt, Arthur D (NY ED) 1.20 (0.71)
Rakoff, Jed S (NY SD) -0.78 (0.43) Scullin, Frederick Jr (NY ND) 1.07 (0.36) Spencer, James R (VA ED) 0.99 (0.67)
Rambo, Sylvia H (PA MD) 0.34 (0.67) Sear, Morey L (LA ED) 0.10 (0.31) Sporkin, Stanley (DC ST) -0.53 (0.74)
Randa, Rudolph T (WI ED) 1.77 (0.40) Seay, Frank H (OK ED) 0.72 (0.00) Sprizzo, John E (NY SD) 0.54 (0.86)
Reade, Linda R (IA ND) 0.18 (0.94) Sedwick, John W (AK ST) 0.24 (0.37) Squatrito, Dominic J (CT ST) 0.48 (0.43)
Real, Manuel L (CA CD) 0.38 (0.52) Seitz, Patricia A (FL SD) -0.73 (0.22) Stadtmueller, J P (WI ED) 0.05 (0.46)
Reasoner, Stephen M (AR ED) 0.25 (0.33) Sessions, William III (VT ST) -0.81 (0.47) Stamp, Frederick Jr (WV SD) -0.39 (0.38)
Reinhard, Philip G (IL ND) 1.16 (0.92) Seybert, Joanna (NY ND) 0.37 (0.67) Standish, William L (PA WD) 0.96 (0.53)
Rendell, Marjorie O (PA ED) -1.02 (0.04) Seymour, Margaret B (SC ST) 0.29 (0.70) Stanton, Louis L (NY SD) -1.07 (0.18)
Rice, Walter H (OH SD) -0.74 (0.20) Shabaz, John C (WI WD) 0.03 (0.80) Steeh, George III (MI ED) 0.06 (0.00)
Roberts, Richard W (DC ST) 0.16 (0.59) Shanahan, Thomas M (NE ST) -0.37 (0.30) Steele, John E (FL MD) 0.02 (0.37)
Roberts, Victoria A (MI ED) -1.23 (0.42) Shanstrom, Jack D (MT ST) -0.38 (0.67) Stein, Sidney H (NY SD) -1.17 (0.12)
Robertson, James (DC ST) -0.86 (0.17) Sharp, Allen (IN ND) 0.16 (0.62) Story, Richard W (GA ND) 1.00 (0.58)
Robinson, Mary Lou (TX ND) 0.08 (0.35) Sharp, George (FL MD) 2.50 (0.17) Stotler, Alicemarie H (CA CD) -0.62 (0.44)
Robinson, Sue Lewis (DE ST) 0.85 (0.67) Shedd, Dennis W (SC ST) 2.35 (0.54) Strand, Roger G (AZ ST) -0.19 (0.02)
Robreno, Eduardo C (PA ED) 1.18 (0.64) Shubb, William B (CA ED) -0.12 (0.55) Sullivan, Emmet G (DC ST) -0.40 (0.65)
Roettger, Norman (FL SD) 1.26 (0.93) Sifton, Charles P (NY ED) -0.61 (0.52) Surrick, R Barclay (PA ED) -0.13 (0.63)
Roll, John Mccarthy (AZ ST) 1.07 (0.80) Silver, Roslyn O (AZ ST) -0.31 (0.42) Swain, Laura Taylor (NY SD) 0.14 (0.68)
Rosen, Gerald E (MI ED) -0.54 (1.04) Simandle, Jerome B (NJ ST) 0.31 (0.55) Tarnow, Arthur J (MI ED) -0.64 (0.40)
Rosenbaum, James M (MN ST) -0.97 (0.24) Skretny, William M (NY WD) 1.39 (1.15) Tauro, Joseph L (MA ST) -1.11 (0.09)
Rosenthal, Lee H (TX SD) -0.75 (0.20) Sleet, Gregory M (DE ST) -0.28 (0.50) Taylor, Anna Diggs (MI ED) -0.02 (0.80)
Ross, Allyne R (NY ED) -0.71 (0.45) Smalkin, Frederic N (MD ST) 0.00 (0.65) Tevrizian, Dickran Jr (CA CD) -0.27 (0.29)
Rothstein, Barbara (WA WD) -1.57 (0.04) Smith, C L Jr (AL ND) 0.56 (0.55) Thompson, Alvin W (CT ST) -1.11 (0.15)
Rufe, Cynthia M (PA ED) -1.62 (0.02) Smith, Fern M (CA ND) -1.27 (0.18) Thompson, Anne E (NJ ST) -0.98 (0.22)
Russell, Thomas B (KY WD) 0.54 (0.39) Smith, George C (OH SD) 1.69 (0.52) Thompson, Myron H (AL MD) -0.76 (0.25)
Ryskamp, Kenneth L (FL SD) 1.20 (1.07) Smith, Ortrie D (MO WD) -0.70 (0.25) Thornburg, Lacy H (NC WD) 0.97 (0.54)
Sands, W Louis (GA MD) 0.85 (0.19) Smith, Rebecca B (VA ED) -1.19 (0.18) Thrash, Thomas Jr (GA ND) 0.07 (0.34)
Saris, Patti B (MA ST) -0.84 (0.31) Smith, Walter S Jr (TX WD) 3.17 (0.26) Tidwell, G Ernest (GA ND) -0.60 (0.57)
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Judge Name (District) CBI Score Judge Name (District) CBI Score Judge Name (District) CBI Score
Tilley, Norwood Jr (NC MD) -0.15 (0.84) Williams, Ann Claire (IL ND) -1.24 (0.02)
Timlin, Robert (CA CD) -0.61 (0.31) Wilson, Samuel G (VA WD) 1.54 (0.56)
Tinder, John Daniel (IN SD) 1.10 (0.77) Wilson, Stephen V (CA CD) -0.77 (0.47)
Torres, Ernest C (RI ST) -0.87 (0.36) Wilson, William Jr (AR ED) -0.19 (0.40)
Trager, David G (NY ED) -0.56 (0.50) Wingate, Henry T (MS SD) 0.20 (0.72)
Trimble, James T Jr (LA WD) 0.08 (0.90) Winmill, B Lynn (ID ST) 1.00 (0.40)
Tunheim, John R (MN ST) -1.36 (0.03) Wolf, Mark L (MA ST) -1.32 (0.11)
Underhill, Stefan R (CT ST) -0.81 (0.52) Wolin, Alfred M (NJ ST) -0.64 (0.46)
Ungaro, Ursula B (FL SD) 0.80 (0.66) Wood, Kimba M (NY SD) -1.11 (0.10)
Urbina, Ricardo M (DC ST) 0.77 (0.45) Woodlock, Douglas (MA ST) -0.16 (0.57)
Vanantwerpen, Frank (PA ED) -1.27 (0.10) Wright, Susan W (AR ED) 0.64 (0.15)
Vanaskle, Thomas I (PA MD) 0.82 (0.42) Yohn, William H Jr (PA ED) -0.64 (0.30)
Vanbebber, G Thomas (KS ST) 0.43 (1.17) Young, Richard L (IN SD) 1.47 (0.36)
Vance, Sarah S (LA ED) -1.07 (0.19) Young, William G (MA ST) -0.72 (0.39)
Vansickle, Fred L (WA ED) -1.46 (0.06) Zagel, James B (IL ND) -0.67 (0.35)
Vazquez, Martha (NM ST) -1.04 (0.21) Zatkoff, Lawrence P (MI ED) 0.78 (0.68)
Vollmer, Richard Jr (AL SD) 1.15 (0.55) Zilly, Thomas S (WA WD) -1.31 (0.09)
Vratil, Kathryn Hoefer (KS ST) 0.44 (0.58) Zloch, William J (FL SD) -0.73 (0.20)
Waldman, Jay C (PA ED) -1.08 (0.28) Zobel, Rya W (MA ST) -1.41 (0.16)
Walker, Vaughn R (CA ND) -1.26 (0.13)
Walls, William H (NJ ST) -0.88 (0.20)
Walter, Donald E (LA WD) 2.26 (0.36)
Wanger, Oliver W (CA ED) -0.26 (0.61)
Ware, James (CA ND) 1.24 (0.67)
Wells, Lesley Brooks (OH ND) -0.98 (0.37)
Werlein, Ewing Jr (TX SD) 1.77 (0.41)
Whaley, Robert H (WA ED) -0.68 (0.32)
Whelan, Thomas J (CA SD) -0.20 (0.43)
Whipple, Dean (MO WD) -0.48 (0.33)
White, George W (OH ND) -0.17 (0.00)
Whyte, Ronald M (CA ND) 0.16 (0.77)
Wilken, Claudia A (CA ND) -1.19 (0.10)
Williams, Alex Jr (MD ST) -0.94 (0.13)
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